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ROMANTIC THEORY1 
by Ernst Behler 
In 1797, Ludwig Tieck published the dramatic comedy Der gestiefelte 
Kuter in the second volume of his Gesummelfe Volksmarchen. The material 
for this play was drawn from the collection of Contes de ma mtre I'oie 
by Charles Perrault; as in the world-famous fairy tale, a grateful cat helps 
a poor miller's son to become the Count of Carabas and eventually to 
marry the King's beautiful daughter. Tieck used the plot of the fairy tale 
as the basis for a satirical diatribe directed against the representatives of 
the EnIightenment and their melodramatic plays of sentiment, so popular 
at the time. Yet this travesty has come to be regarded as a model of so-called 
Romantic irony. Although Tieck's Der gestiefelte Kater has precedents in 
earlier plays, his Romantic comedy constituted the epitome of a particular 
dramatic device. More predominantly than in other contemporary works, 
the course of action is here repeatedly interrupted, and the intensification 
of theatrical illusion is again and again destroyed. 
Tieck achieved this effect mainly by presenting on stage along with 
the actors not only the audience, but even the poet, who often comments 
to his public directly. Observers in the audience, in turn, make exclamations 
such as: "Was mich nur argert, ist daR sich kein Mensch im Stuck uber den 
Kater wundert; der Konig und alle tun, als muate es so sein."-"Unmoglich 
kann ich da in eine vernunftige Illusion hineinkommen." Truly "beautiful 
moments," especially in love scenes, are greeted by the audience with 
appreciative cries of "Das war doch etwas furs Herz!"-"Das tut einem 
wieder einmal wohl!"-"Obs aber zum Ganzen wird notwendig sein?," 
whereas the cat merely remarks from the stage: "Sie sind da unten ins 
Poetische hineingeplumpst!" Upon reciting his part in the comedy, an actor 
remarks: "Verffuchte Unnaturlichkeiten sind da in dem Stiick," saying to 
the King: "Sein Sie doch ja damit ruhig, denn sonst merkt es ja am Ende 
das Publikum da unten, daR das eben sehr unnaturlich ist." To this the 
King replies: "Schadet nichts, es hat vorher geklatscht, und da kann ich 
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schon etwas bieten." In order to intensify the effect of these reflections, 
Tieck has a buffoon and a court sage dispute in the third act the question 
as to whether the new play with the title Der gestiefelte Kater is a good 
play and whether the audience had been correctly depicted, whereupon 
the astonished outcry arises from the depths of the audience: "Das 
Publikum? Es kommt ja kein Publikum in dem Stiick vor!"" 
Also in 1797, Friedrich Schlegel published a collection of 127 critical 
aphorisms in the periodical Lyceum, some of which have often been taken 
as a theoretical definition of the literary technique employed by Tieck. 
However, these aphorisms had no demonstrable influence on Tieck and 
indeed go considerably beyond his intentions. In his collection Schlegel 
designated as the central motif of irony a constant disruption and tran- 
scendence of one's own poetic creations. In Aphorism 42, he said: 
Es glbt alte und moderne Gedichte, die durchgangig im Ganzen und uberall den gottlichen 
Hauch der Ironle atmen. Es lebt in ihnen wirklich eine transzendentale Buffonerie. Im 
Innern, die Stimmung, welche alles ubersieht, und sich uber alles Bedingte unendlich 
erhebt, auch uber elgne Kunst, Tugend, oder Genidltat: im Adern ,  in der Ausfuhrung, 
die mlmlsche Manier eines guten italienlschen Buffo. 
This mood, by which the author "rises infinitely" above everything finite, is 
expressly described in Aphorism 108, where Schlegel says of irony: 
Sie enthalt und erregt ein Gefuhl von dem unaufloslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten 
und des Bedingten, der Unm6glichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer vollstandigen Mitteilung. 
Sie 1st die freieste aller Lizenzen, denn durch sie setzt man sich iiber sich selbst weg: 
und doch auch die gesetzllchste, denn sie ist unbedingt notwendig.' 
These comments on the creative process clearly anticipate the principles 
of the definition of irony later to be formulated in the Athenaeum. Here, 
in Aphorism 5 1, Schlegel characterized irony by means of two interrelated 
terms, calling it a "steter Wechsel von Selbstschopfung und Selbstver- 
nichtung." A similar and recurrent formulation of the same phenomenon 
is the phrase "bis zur Ironie gebildet, " by which Schlegel understood the 
highest artistic perfection, a perfection, however, which just because of its 
utmost achievement necessarily leads to self-criticism, and thus shifts to 
its contrary.: As is evident from these quotations, Schlegel found two 
antagonistic powers in the author's creative drive. The positive pole of 
this dialectical pair is an effervescent poetic enthusiasm for expression, 
which is called self-creation in the more subjective language of the Athe- 
naeum. The counterbalancing, limiting, and corrective scepticism towards the 
poet's own productive powers is termed self-destruction. The result of this 
ironical alternation between self-creation and self-destruction Schlegel 
labels "self-restraint" ("Selbstbeschrankung"), i.e., the disciplined master- 
ing of the creative drive.6 
Although this oscillation between self-creation and self-destruction, 
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enthusiasm and scepticism, characterizes the essential meaning of Schlegel's 
concept of irony, we see upon closer examination that there are other aspects 
of irony delineated in the Athenaeum. In  Aphorisms 116 and 238 a different 
nuance comes to light, which has close ties with the theory of the novel, 
so central to Schlegel's thought at that time. He was attracted to the genre 
of the novel because of its potentiality for allowing the personality of the 
writer to manifest itself in the work to such an extraordinary degree that 
the author himself becomes its central component. Just as Fichte had taught 
that there must be an intimate unity between the philosopher and his system, 
so Schlegel believed that poetry should combine its poetic substance "mit 
der kiinstlerischen Reflexion und schonen Selbsrbespiegelung" of the 
author. In his words, poetry should "in jeder ihrer Darstelfungen sich selbst 
mit darstellen, und iiberall Poesie und Poesie der Poesie ~ e i n . " ~  In his 
famous Aphorism 116, he remarked that Romantic poetry can soar, free 
from all real and ideal interests, on the wings of poetic reflection midway 
between the work and the artist and can even exponentiate this reflection 
and multiply it as in an endless series of mirrors. For this beautiful self- 
mirroring of the author in his work, Schlegel coined the term "poetische 
Reflexion," and in this concept we can see a reformulation of his original 
definition of Romantic irony.' 
This theory of irony had strong repercussions and came to be considered 
the core of that mental attitude labeled by later critics as Romantic irony. 
Regarding the influence of his aphorisms, Schlegel said: "Erst seitdem ist 
die Ironie an die Tagesordnung g e k ~ m m e n . " ~  In fact, this device of irony 
certainly constitutes a prominent feature of German literature of the time. 
It was utilized on the stage-obviously in the wake of Tieck-in Grabbe's 
Scherz, Satire, Ironie und tiefere Bedeutung (1827), a play in which the 
author appears on stage and is greeted by his characters with the salutation: 
"Er is so dumm wie ein KuhfuR, schimpft auf alle Schrifsteller und taugt 
selber nichts, hat verrenkte Beine, schielende Augen und ein fades Affen- 
gesicht," Yet another actor comments: "Wie erbittert sind Sie gegen einen 
Mann, der Sie geschrieben hat!"1° Rene Wellek has noted: "Today it is 
frequently forgotten that devices considered strikingly modern were common 
among the German Romantics."" 
In the sphere of narration, this tendency was certainly inspired by 
Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. The atmosphere of irony which animates this 
novel was first described by Friedrich Schlegel and considered to derive 
from a seemingly capricious attitude of the author towards his work and 
his hero. More precisely, Schlegel points out "da8 der Dichter selbst die 
Personen und die Begebenheiten so leicht und so launig zu nehmen, den 
Helden fast nie ohne Ironie zu erwahnen, und auf sein Meisterwerk selbst 
von der Hohe seines Geistes herabzulacheln scheint." 'But  it is Brentano's 
novel Godwi that presents the most remarkable degree of originality in 
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the implementation of the ironic device. The author, Maria, meets his hero 
Godwi and exclaims: "Dies war also Godwi, von dem ich so vie1 geschrieben 
habe.. . . Ich hatte ihn mir ganz anders vorgestellt." The hero retaliates 
against such mistreatment by saying: "Dies ist der Teich, in den ich Seite 
266 im ersten Band falle." l3 Brentano drives this technique to its utmost 
potential when the author of the novel finally dies and is said to have 
been bored to death while engaged in composing the second part of his 
story. 
This ironic counterpoint of illusionary poetry and empirical reality was 
used by the Romantics not only in the sense of a destruction of imagination 
through reality, but also in the reversed procedure of transporting the real 
into the imaginative sphere. Novalis says in one of his aphorisms: "Die 
Kunst auf eine angenehme Art zu befremden, einen Gegenstand fremd 
zu machen und doch bekannt und anziehend, das ist die romantische 
Poetik,"" a statement which seems to anticipate the dramatic device of 
alienation. E. T. A. Hoffmann was a master of the art of blending together 
two different spheres of reality, of transposing prosaic everyday scenes into 
a fantastic milieu, of abruptly switching from ordinary events to fanciful 
occurrences. We have just to think of the scene in the Der goldne Topf 
in which Anselmus takes leave of Archivarius Lindhorst only to see him 
take flight and soar above the Elbe River, coat tails flying in the air-and 
thls related as if it were the most natural form of departure.15 
In the genre of lyric poetry, Romantic irony was utilized at a relatively 
late date. When it made its appearance in Heinrich Heine's poetic works, 
the basic structure reflected the previously mentioned discrepancy of the 
poetic and the empirical worlds. Here, however, it is intimately bound to 
the phenomenon of the lyrical ego. By nature, this lyrical ego has a broad, 
transcendental, and, if not universal, then at least a widely human scope 
that surpasses the limited existence of the individual poet.'@ Irony comes 
to the fore when the metaphysical being of the lyrical ego is suddenly 
exchanged for the empirical ego of the individual poet. There are, of course, 
other modes of irony in lyric poetry, but an illustration of this particular 
type can be found in an episode of Heine's lyric cycle Die Nordsee in 
which the poet feels the irresistible attraction of a female creature from 
the depths of the sea. Just at the point of plunging himself into union 
with her, he is held back by a firm grip at the ankle and hears the captain 
query: "Doktor, sind Sie des Teufels?" l7 
Aside from these literary creations, irony was to become a prominent 
theme of nineteenth-century aesthetics in the works of Jean Paul, August 
Wilhelm SchIegel, and Solger. Last but not least, Romantic irony came 
into its own through the sharp polemics of Hegel and, in his wake, 
Kierkegaard, who attacked this seemingly pernicious ironic posture. 
Romantic irony appeared to these thinkers, who concerned themselves only 
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with the Absolute, as irresponsible arbitrariness. In a famous dictum taken 
up by Kierkegaard, Hegel called this supposedly playful mood the very 
height of subjectivity separating itself from the unifying substance, or in 
the semireligious language of his Phenomenology, "das deklarierte Bose." IR 
Elaborating upon this thought, Kierkegaard said: 
Irony now appeared as that attltude for whlch there was nothing sacred left; this Irony 
was through wlth everything, yet at the same tlme had absolute power to do everything. 
Whenever Irony allowed something to remaln, this was only with the knowledge of b e ~ n g  
able to destroy 11, and this knowledge was present at the same moment in whlch the 
object was perm~tted to endure. If it posited something, ~t knew it had the authority 
to annul it, and thls at the same moment it was pos~ted. It knew Itself to be in complete 
possession of the absolute power to blnd and to loose." 
But this form of Romantic irony is by no means limited to German 
literature. An essential quality of Lord Byron's late satire Don Juan resides 
precisely in this ironic distrust of the poet towards his own artistic emotions 
and, more specifically, in the intermingling of the conflicting feelings of 
affection and repulsion, of enthusiasm and boredom, of delight and scep- 
ticism. To a certain extent the author permeates his work in a dual fashion 
by depicting the passions of his characters, their desires, loves, and longings, 
in captivating verses, while simultaneously smiling at the illusions of youth, 
thereby emphasizing with wit and irony the contradictions of their pre- 
tension~.?~ The double presence of the author as both creative poet and 
cynical commentator creates a mocking tone from the very beginning, an 
ironical attitude that regards the author's own creation with suspicion: 
All these th~ngs will be specified in tlrne, 
With strict regard to Aristotle's rules, 
The Vade Mecum of the true sublime, 
Whlch makes so many poets and some fools; 
Prose poets llke blank verse, I'm fond of rhyme, 
Good workmen never quarrel with thelr tools; 
I've got new mythological machinery, 
And very handsome supernatural scenery." 
It is in a similar vein, yet concerned more directly with the illusions 
of youth than with his own creation, that Stendhal utilizes Romantic irony, 
especially in Le  Rouge et le N o i ~ ? ~  As is well know, this author's literary 
pursuits were guided by a philosophy of life called Beylism, which assumes 
an ironical pose towards existence and harbors the conviction that man's 
behavior is governed from within by'deep and sincere passions-above 
all by the pursuit of happiness.%< Man's true nature, however, is usually 
hidden beneath the surface of customs, habits, politeness, and certain duties 
considered as necessary for the self-assertion of the individual. A most 
important task of the author is to develop what Stendhal called "la gkologie 
morale" of his heroes, that is, to show without illusion from what interested 
motives their actions and virtues spring, to pull away the masks formed 
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by habit, and to expose the character in his real identity. This process 
is unforgettably presented in the development of Stendhal's illustrious hero 
Julien Sorel, who is passionate and sincere by nature, but deliberately 
assumes a career of hypocrisy in order to play his game with society. "On 
a des devoirs suivant la portte de son esprit" is Julien's motto. Stendhalian 
irony is at its best when in crucial moments the original nature of the 
hero breaks through and destroys the illusion of imaginary duties, 
Stendhal's technique thus consists again in a blending of two systems, 
that of pragmatic, even hypocritical, rationality on the surface of characters, 
and of sincere, individualistic feeling within. To put it differently, he  
confronts the intellect with the heart in the conviction that for the possessors 
of a sensitive heart, this masking is the only means of protection against 
the vulgar masses. Dostoevski was later to incorporate this dualism of intellect 
and heart into his works, while Friedrich Nietzsche was deeply moved by 
the concept of the mask as a prerequisite and protection for sincere existence, 
as is reflected in his statements: "Alles, was tief ist, liebt die Maske." "Jeder 
auserlesene Mensch trachtet instinktiv nach seiner Burg und Heimlichkeit, 
wo er von der Menge, den Vielen, den Allermeisten erlost ist."%' Thus 
Stendhal's "geologic morale7' transcends the realm of Romanticism and 
points to the more psychological trends of the future. Interestingly enough, 
it was Nietzsche who first recognized the affiliation between Stendhal and 
Dostoevski when in February 1887 in Nice he found by chance or, as 
he felt, by instinct, the new French translation of Dostoevski's Notes from 
the Underground (L'esprit souterrain). He characterized this work as a 
"Geniestreich der Psychologie, eine Art Selbstverhohnung des yv08i U ~ U T ~ V , "  
and added in a letter to Overbeck: "Ich mu8 bis zu meinem Bekanntwerden 
mit Stendhals Rouge et Noir zuriickgehen, um einer gleichen Freude mich 
zu erinnern."2i The ironical implications of this self-disdain of "Know 
Thyself' will be discussed toward the end of this paper, 
Romantic irony has been given so much emphasis here because it marks 
a turning point, if not in the development of ironic practices, then at least 
in the history of the concept. When we employ this term we are hardly 
aware of the fact that until the end of the eighteenth century, the meaning 
of irony was extremely limited in Western criticism. Authors such as Diderot, 
Fielding, or Sterne would have been astonished to hear us interpret their 
literary creations as displaying irony-to say nothing of Shakespeare, 
Cervantes, and other oIder models of the ironic style. Until far into the 
eighteenth century the word irony maintains a strict and consistent con- 
notation and designates an established form of speech or literary com- 
munication which can be reduced to the simple formula, "une figure par 
laquelle on veut faire entendre le contraire de ce qu'on dit." This quotation 
was taken from the renowned French Encyclopedia of 1765 and contains 
the essence of the definitions of irony in numerous handbooks of the various 
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European l i t e r a t~ res .~~  One could easily demonstrate that whenever irony 
is the subject of a formal discussion prior to the Romantic era, it is this 
basic concept that is reiterated with slight variations-a demonstration that 
shall not be presented here at length. When Defoe was accused of excessive 
satire in certain treatises, he defended them as being ironic: 
The Books I have written are as plain a Satyr upon the Pretender and his Friends, as can 
be written, if they are view'd Impartially; but being written Ironically, all the first Part, if 
takenasunderfrom thelast Part,willread, asinallIronicalspeakingmust be,justcontrary .... 
A similar excuse was given by Swift for his bitterly satirical Proposal to 
pay off the National Debt without raising any taxes: "The Reader will 
perceive the following Treatise to be altogether Ironical," an assertion 
indicating that he had said the contrary ofwhat he actually thought.% 
One should perhaps mention that this original definition of irony 
occasionally has the qualification that the rhetorical dissimulation should 
have an  agreeable effect, in accordance with the Ciceronian formula 
designating the presence of irony, "cum toto genere Orationis severe ludas, 
cum aliter sentias ac 10quare."~~ Swift, however, provides the exception 
to the rule, for his figures of speech certainly cannot be said to have a 
jocose flavor. Indeed, his suggestion of devouring little children as a remedy 
for the famine in Ireland in his Modest Proposal assumes a biting if not 
morbid character.30 
Whereas irony retained the meaning of a trope "where the contrary is 
meant to what is said" well into the eighteenth century, this classical 
frame was sprung by the Romantics, who conceived of it as a device 
permitting the author to rise above the confines of his work, to appear 
within it, and to exhibit deliberately the fictionaI character of his creation. 
Although this literary strategy had never been called ironic until this time, 
it was nevertheless nothing new at all. From a broader perspective, we 
see that this literary practice had been flourishing throughout the eighteenth 
century, reaching its height in Laurence Sterne's Tristram S h ~ n d y , ~ '  Blank 
pages of this novel represent missing chapters which are inserted in 
subsequent parts of the work with the explanation: "For how was it possible 
they [the readers] should foresee the necessity I was under of writing the 
25th chapter of my book before the 18th!" Or the omission of a description 
of a journey is justified by the ironic reflection: 
But the painting of this journey, upon reviewing lt, appears to be so much above the 
style and manner of anything else I have been able to paint in this book, that it could 
not have remained in it without depreciating every other scene; and destroying at the 
same time that necessary equipoise and balance (whether good or bad) betwixt chapter 
and chapter, from whence the just proportions and harmony of the whole work results.33 
Thus it becomes evident that the Romantic doctrine of irony was by 
no means thought to delineate something new, but rather intended to give 
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an essential feature of modern literature, long in existence, its name. The 
intermingling of two spheres of reality, the bringing together of lofty and 
trivia1 things, and the contradictory voices that sharpen the contour of what 
is happening, was detected in Shakespeare, whose irony was discussed by 
August Wilhelm Schlegel precisely in  these terms.33 
The coincidence of contrasting elements, of mirth and sadness, so essential 
to the newly envisioned concept of irony also evokes a figure who with 
fool's cap and bells is a predominant character of Renaissance literature-the 
wise fool, who appears in Sebastian Brant with death-inviting gestures, 
in Rabelais with excessive Pantagruelistic laughter, in Cervantes with 
mournful countenance, in Shakespeare with the burlesque buffoonery of 
Falstaff, but in Erasmus with the full decorum of classical rhetoric. What 
characterizes this type of irony is a peculiar combination of jest and ser- 
iousness, wisdom and foolishness, knowledge and ignorance." When in 
Erasmus' Praise of Folly, Stultitia (Folly) praises what is blameworthy and 
blames matters that deserve praise, the author seems to apply the basic 
ironic formula of saying the contrary of what one really thinks. Yet Folly 
carries the reversal of established evaluations to such an extreme that this 
ironic inversion suddenly becomes earnest, so that foolishness appears as 
wisdom, and wisdom as foolishness. Finally, Folly confronts us with one 
of the most subtle ideas in Christianity, the fool in Christ.% 
The most brilliant embodiment of Romantic irony in the form of the 
author's critical remarks towards his own production, of inserting subjective 
commentaries on the novel within a novel, was seen by the Romantic critics 
in Cervantes' Don Quixote. It is, indeed, a characteristic feature of Don 
Quixote, especially of the second part, that the author repeatedly breaks 
through the atmosphere of the narration and addresses critical questions 
and reflections to his reader. In this manner, Cervantes liked to call certain 
portions of his work "apocryphal," since Sancho Panza made various 
statements in them which were impossible to reconcile with his limited 
intel l igen~e.~~ In Chapter 2 of the second part, in a conversation with his 
master, Sancho Panza discusses Don Quixote's true identity, pointing out 
that there is a book about The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote de la 
Manchu. In the following conversation, Cervantes puts his critics on trial 
through the questions of Don Q u i x ~ t e . : ~  On the whole, this second part 
is characterized by the confrontation of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza 
with people to whom they are familiar through the reading of the first 
part. In other words, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza here step out of 
the literary sphere, in which they have heretofore lived, into the real world- 
which, however, is merely the intensified literary realm of the first part.38 
Yet if one were to pursue the line of development of this kind of irony, 
one would soon be brought from the Renaissance back into the Middle 
Ages. The emergence of the author from within his work can already be 
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found in Chaucer, especially in that episode of The Canterbury Tales in 
which the narrator, the Inn-keeper, suddenly notices an unfamiliar figure 
among the pilgrims. It is, indeed, Chaucer himself whom the narrator 
pointedly addresses: 
'Say something now, as other folk have done; 
And let it be a tale of mirth; at once!' 
'Host', I replied, 'I hope you are not one 
To take it In bad part if I'm a dunce; 
I only know a rhyme which, for the nonce, 
I learnt.' 'That's good,' he said, 'well take your place; 
It should be dainty, judging by your face.'39 
At this request, Chaucer proceeds to relate the courtly tale of Sir Topaz, 
only to be rudely interrupted in the middle of a sentence: 
'No more of this for God's dear dignity!' 
Our Host sard suddenly, 'You're wearying me 
To death, I say, w ~ t h  your Illiterate stuff.''O 
At the end of the Tales, Chaucer makes apologies to those who might 
be displeased by his work, begging them to "impute it to the fault of my 
want of ability, and not to my will, who would very gladly have said better 
if I had had the power," a self-deprecation reminiscent of his Prologue, 
where he had said, "I'm short of wit as you will ~nderstand.'"~ 
Similar postures of humility can be observed throughout the Middle 
Ages. To give but one famous early example, one could refer to Wolfram 
von Eschenbach's Parzival, where the author claims at the end of Book 
2: "ine kan decheinen buochstap." "' At this point, however, our derivational 
tree of Romantic irony becomes very controversial, since we are touching 
upon the noted humility device, the parvifas-formula of "mediocritas mea" 
and similar assertions of incompetence. This attitude has been traced back 
as far as I Corinthians 15: 9-12, where the apostle Paul states regarding 
himself: "ego enim sum minimus Apostolorum, qui non sum dignus vocari 
Apostolus,"-clearly exhibiting the Christian virtue of humility, certainIy 
different from ironic dissimulation. In its literary shape, the humility device 
seems to derive from classical rhetoric, Cicero's De inventione I, 16, 22, 
prescribing strict rules for the author's "proemium," his introduction, for 
the purpose of "captatio benevolentiae." As early as the fifth and sixth 
centuries, these rules had become clichks of the stylistic mannerism of late 
antiquity and yet were to prevail during the Middle Ages and into the 
Renaissance and Baroque periods.13 In the Preface to his Genealogia Deorum 
Gentilium, a comprehensive scholarly study on Greek mythology, Boccaccio, 
for instance, addresses King Hugo IV of Cyprus and Jerusalem, ostensibly 
his patron, by way of this humility device: 
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Atlas was able to uphold the heaven on his head, and Alcides was equal to relieving 
him of the weary load-divine men both and both invincibly strong. But me? What am 
I but a little fellow, weak, slow-w~tted, forgetful. And here you are trying to pile on 
my shoulders not heaven aIone, which was enough for those old heroes, but earth too, 
and the seas, nay, the very gods with all their notable train! Why, it's nothing but a 
proposal to crush and destroy me." 
This topos of affected modesty can be traced throughout the centuries. 
It should be born in mind, however, that here we are dealing with a different 
and autonomous topos that should be distinguished from irony. 
In order to understand this integration of modern literary practices with 
the ancient concept of irony, it seems appropriate to consider the derivation 
and the techniques of classical irony, a form that had most tenaciously 
been preserved in the classical system of rhetoric. Rhetoric was the second 
of the seven liberal arts and certainly the most important subject for literary 
training, having exerted for centuries a decisive and continuous influence 
on the course of Western literature as a whole. Rhetoric formed that part 
of encyclopedic scholastic tradition which emphasized the art of public 
speaking, or of persuasion, in its curriculum. If in this schematized structure 
one were to look for the classical topos of irony, one would find it first 
in the column of the tropes, that is, under indirect modes of speech 
(including metaphor, allegory, metalepsis, irony, hyperbaton) and secondly, 
in the rubric of figures of speech, that is, of unusual verbal constructions 
(including question, anticipation, hesitation, consultation, apostrophe, illus- 
tration, irony, feigned regret, intimation, and so forth). In fact, irony is 
discussed by the classical rhetoricians in connection with peculiar idio- 
syncracies of style. Aristotle mentions it in the third book of his Rhetoric, 
which is devoted to style, and designates it as "a mockery of oneself": 
"Some of the forms befit a gentleman, and some do not; irony befits him 
more than does buffoonery. The jests of the ironical man are at his own 
expense; the buffoon excites laughter at others."'" 
From other passages in his works, especially from his Ethics, we know 
that Aristotle conceived of irony as a noble self-deprecation. "Irony is the 
contrary of boastful exaggeration," he states, "it is a self-depreciating 
concealment of one's powers and possessions-it shows better taste to 
depreciate than to exaggerate one's virtues." iG Cicero, who introduced the 
term into the Latin world and rendered it by "dissimulatio" ("ea dissim- 
ulatio, quam Graeci ~ i ~ ~ v ~ i a  vacant")," discussed irony in his work De 
Oratore in connection with figures of speech; he defined irony as saying 
one thing and meaning another, explaining that it had a very great influence 
on the minds of the audience and was extremely entertaining if it was 
presented in a conversational rather than declamatory tone.'I8 Finally, 
Quintilian assigned irony its position among the tropes and figures discussed 
in the eighth and ninth books of h s  Institutio oratoria, where its basic 
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characteristic was that the intention of the speaker differs from what he 
actually says, that we understand the contrary of what he expresses in 
speech: "in utroque enim contrarium ei quod dicitur intelligendum est." 
In addition to these two formal modes of irony, Quintilian mentions a 
third, which transcends the scope of mere rhetoric: "Cum etiam, vita 
universa ironiam habere videatur, qualis est visa Socratis; nam ideo dictus 
agens imperitum et admiratorem aliorum tanquam sapientium." 50 
As this remark demonstrates, Quintilian, as well as Cicero and other 
rhetoricians, regarded Socrates as the master of irony, the ~rppov. Here 
we are at the very roots of our subject, and also at the origins of the 
word irony itself, the Greek ~lpoveior, rendered by the Romans as 
"dissimulatio." The words ~ipoveior and &?pwv, however, originally had 
a low and vulgar connotation, even to the extent of being an invective. 
We come across these terms in Aristophanes' comedies, in which the ~ t ~ w v ,  
the ironist, is placed among liars, shysters, pettifoggers, hypocrites, and 
charlatans-in other words, with deceivers.$' Plato was the first to present 
Socrates as ironic, as an interlocutor who, by understating his talents in 
his famous pose of ignorance, embarrasses his partner and simultaneously 
leads him into the proper train of thought. Thus the attitude of the ironic 
figure was freed from the burlesque coarseness of the classical comedy 
and appeared with that refined, human, and humorous self-deprecation 
that made Socrates the paragon of the teacher. 
Yet even in Plato's dialogues, where the spirit of Socratic irony is so 
obviously present, the term irony still retains its derogatory cast in the 
sense of hoax and hyprocrisy and, as such, evinces the Sophist attitude 
of intellectual deception and false pretensions. In his Republic, for example, 
Plato depicts the scene in which Socrates deliberates, in characteristic 
fashion, on the concept of ~ L K ~ L O ~ B V ~ ,  i.e., justice. At a crucial point in 
the discussion, his conversational partner Thrasymachus explodes, begging 
Socrates to desist from his eternal questioning and refuting in order to 
make a direct statement and reveal his own opinion. Again assuming his 
stance of ignorance, Socrates replies that it is so utterly difficult to discover 
justice that they should have pity rather than scorn for him. At this, 
Thrasymachus cries: "By Heracles! Here again is the well-known dissim- 
ulation of Socrates! I have told these others beforehand that you would 
not answer, but take refuge in dissimulation.'' The Greek term rendered 
here by dissimulation is ~lpwveicu." 
From many other instances in Plato's dialogues, we know that the 
pretended ignorance of Socrates was considered by many of his con- 
temporaries as chicanery, scorn, or deceptive escapism, all of which made 
him deserve the epithet ~ f ~ o v .  Only through Aristotle did irony assume 
that refined and urbane tinge marking the essence of "Socratic irony." 
This significant change in meaning can be detected in Aristotle's Nico- 
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machean Ethics, where EI~WVELCY and &ha<oveia, understatement and 
boastfulness, are discussed as modes of deviation from truth. Aristotle, 
however, held the opinion that irony deviates from truth not for the sake 
of one's own advantage, but out of a dislike for bombast, and was therefore 
a fine and noble form. The prototype of this genuine irony was to be 
found in Socrates, and thus irony had received its classical stamp.j3 
Here it becomes evident why the Romantics included certain devices 
of modern literature within the concept of irony; for the situation in which 
Socrates was placed as a philosopher in front of his disciples appeared 
similar to that of the modern author in his attempt to communicate with 
his reader. The problem of literary communication had become increasingly 
complex since the classical age. The English philosopher Shaftesbury 
indicated how ridiculous it would be for a modern author to refer to the 
inspiration of his Muse, as the ancients had done.% Confronted with this 
obstacle, the modern writer assumed an attitude towards his readers strongly 
resembling that of Socrates towards his pupils. He understated his talents, 
parodied old patterns, pretended to draw on a lost manuscript, commented 
upon himself and his creation, and included the reader in his creative task 
by establishing a contrast between expectation and actual narration. Socratic 
irony thus served as an aid to overcome a fundamental dilemma and enabled 
him to convey a message which otherwise could hardly be communicated. 
In a word, Socratic irony became the force by which means he could-in 
Schlegel's terms-"infinitely rise above himself." 
Thus far, we have considered certain techniques of pre-Romantic and 
Romantic literature as variations of the basic figure of rhetorical dissimu- 
lation, the genera1 significance of which resides in conveying indirectly 
a deeper message underlying the more superficial meaning that seems to 
be communicated. But the reformulation of irony, as it materialized in 
the Romantic age, seems to carry us beyond this era and far into the 
nineteenth century, where ironic ambivalence presents itself in a more 
interiorized, psychological, and existential fashlon. It is the dilemma of 
the modern author faced with the paradox of striving to communicate while 
possessing an intensified distrust towards his creative powers. One of the 
most striking illustrations of this trend is Dostoevski's Notes from the 
Underground, in which a despicable creature, a "negative hero," introduced 
as "one of the characters of the recent past, one of the representatives 
of the current generation," addresses a nonexistent audience in painfully 
self-degrading monologues: 
Gentlemen .... Can you really be so credulous as to think that I will print a11 this and 
give ~t to you to read too? And another problem: why do I really call you "gentlemen," 
why do I address you as though you really were my readers? Such declarations as I 
intend to make are never printed nor given to other people to read. Anyway, I am not 
strong-minded enough for that, and I don't see why I should be. But you see, a fancy 
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has occurred to me and I want to fulfill 11 at all costs. Let me explain. . . . I am writlng 
for myself, and wish to declare once and for all that if I write as though I were addressing 
readers, that is s~mply because it 1s easier for me to write in that way. It 1s merely a 
question of form, only an empty form-I shall never have readers. I have made this 
plaln already.6d 
Out of these agonizing monologues there arises in indirect presentation 
one of the most intense criticisms of modern civilization, of rationalistic 
optimism, which is compressed into vivid formulas such as the "crystal 
palace," the "anthill," the "chicken coop," or the equation "two times two 
make four," where free will is impossible. This underground man is deeply 
convinced that there must really exist something dearer to man than the 
greatest advantage dictated by reason, something so desirable that to obtain 
it man is ready to act in opposition to the "sublime and beautiful" things 
established by the '"lovers of mankind," By illuminating this innermost 
discrepancy between reason and will, a discordance epitomized in the sin 
commited by man for the sole purpose of proving his freedom, Dostoevski 
presents the ovenvheIming paradox of existence.5G 
This antagonism of aboveground and underground, reason and heart, 
vitality and decadence, intellect and life, leads us back to Nietzsche and 
to some of the initial observations of this paper. We are also touching 
upon the familiar theme of the double, a motif brought into focus by 
Romantic accentuated by Dostoevski, but given a keener note 
by Nietzsche when with respect to precisely this existential dualism, he 
said of himself: "Ich bin ein Doppelganger."j8 Indeed, Nietzsche's vacillation 
between contradictory views of life and his premise that existence permits 
infinite interpretations represent a milestone in the development of the 
ironic attitude. Furthermore, his idea of perspectivism and his gift for 
reversing perspectives imply, in the last analysis, a break with the belief 
in one common and general truth. In other words, when dissimulation 
takes place among mutually exclusive interpretations of existence, it has 
reached its sharpest expression. With regard to the opposition of life and 
intellect, of vitality and decadence, so basic to late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century literature, Nietzsche said: 
Von der Kranken-Optik aus nach gesunderen Begriffen und Werten, und wiedemm 
umgekehrt aus der Fulle und Selbstgewissheit des teichen Lebens hinuntersehen in die 
heimllche Arbe~ t  des DCcadence-Instinkts-das war meine ILngste Ubung, meine 
eigentliche Erfahrung, wenn irgendworin wurde ich darin Meister. Ich habe es jetzt in 
der Hand, ich habe die Hand dafiir, Perspektiven umzustellen." 
This ironical shifting-in Nietzschean fashion-between two poles, between 
the relishing of abundant vitality and the decadent retreat from life, appears 
to be a further variation of the classical figure of irony in that the stand 
taken on one side of the antinomy points indirectly to its opposite pole. 
Yet Nietzsche did not designate this as irony. Having rejected Romanticism, 
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he also had to reject the term irony, which had too Romantic a flavor 
for his taste. He preferred the classical concept of "dissimulatio," which 
he rendered by the word "mask." It was Thomas Mann who saw in this 
alternation the essence of irony, which mediated between the salient anti- 
nomies of life and intellect, but he also gave it a harmonizing, humanizing 
touch: 
Wir lieben ~ h n  (den Vorbehalt) im Geistigen d s  Ironie-jene nach beiden Seiten gerichtete 
Ironie, welche verschlagen und unverbmdlich, wenn auch nicht ohne Herzlichkeit, 
zwischen den Gegensatzen spielt und es m ~ t  Parteinahme und Entscheidung nicht 
sonderlich eilig hat: voll der Vermutung, dass in gtossen Dingen, in Dingen des Menschen, 
jede Entscheidung als vorschnell und vorgultig sich erweisen mdchte, dass nicht 
Entscheidung das Ziel ist, sondern der Einklang,-welcher, wenn es sich urn ewige 
Gegensltze handelt, im Unendlichen liegen mag, den aber jener spielende Vorbehalt, 
Ironie genannt, in sich selber trlgt, wie der VorbehaIt die Aufl~sung.~' 
One could perhaps go on to envision more modern and even con- 
temporary literary techniques as further modifications of the basic figure 
of irony, yet this domain will be left unexplored here except for one final 
observation concerning the underlying supposition of the present paper. 
This is the idea that with respect to certain devices and literary forms, 
Western literature forms a whole to such a degree that the classical age 
is essential to the understanding of modern times. The history of literature 
thus appears as a continuous progression, carrying with it the acquisitions 
of the past as models for the future, to be renewed in unique and unexpected 
ways. This is, in fact, Friedrich Schlegel's thesis, and referring to the 
interrelationship of past and future, tradition and innovation, he once 
remarked, "Alles Alte wird neu durchs Studium des Klassischen, und alles 
Neue sei alt, d.h. klassisch, und wird alt, d.h. iibertroffen, antiquiert." 
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